《外汇交易实战图表与交易心理 》 作 者：(新加坡)许强 (美国)Gary Weiss

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附录

市场的真相

(英文原版及名词解释）

The players and how they interact

There has been great deal written about the focus of several large players within the foreign exchange markets and whether their singular activities are, themselves, capable of predicting or for that matter even exacting change on rate structures both now and in the future. In many ways this is a topic that is not particularly straightforward because there has historically been a focus towards the actions and results of a singular group, as opposed to the inter relationships between them. As a general comment, I believe this analysis tends to be lacking，mostly because the market structure of its component participants are invariably interlinked. Further, the basis for action of one group within the market often causes a reaction eunount the other groups. To put this in perspective, it is necessary to first define broad groups of maricet participants into large bands. For this purpose I will categorize certain groups that may, themselves have a degree of crossover, but can also be maintained within a generalized definitional context. These are:

1.Central Banks

2.Large hedge funds

3.Fundamental “real money” position takers, including corporate hedge vehicles.

4.Chart based speculative traders.

In the case of central banks, there has always been a certain enigma surrounding their particular functions and generalized role within the foreign exchange markets. Moreover, de pending on the region or particular monetary policy within a zone of influence, their activity can be more or less proactive with regard to intervention. Specifically, it's worth trying to classify various types of intervention that might be undertaken because there are tremendous differences as to the goals and issues associated with each. First, and probably the most widely followed is what might be called " concerted intervention" • This is an activity that is really quite infrequent and has mostly to do with a group of central banks acting to influence valuation mismatches that are broad, and across multiple geo political lines. One of the more notable examples of concerted inter vention occurred during the mid 1980^s corresponding to the Plaza accord, wherein the accord itself stated an agreed upon broad mandate to bring down the dollar valuations against a wide group of currency. In this instance, the shared mandate was in the interest of most parties to act upon. As a result, the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and The Bundesbank all acted with a singular purpose and coordinated their intervention entry and exit points so as to effectively move the currency market at various times; selling dollars against a wide basket of currency, and obviously changing the reserve mix of each of the bank participants. However,while having clearly achieved the stated objective, later historians have actually questioned whether the policy was actually achieved by virtue of intervention, or, as is now a more widely held view, was the intervention successful only because it was backed up by the market assumption that fundamental policy change was going to occur in the first place. This is an important distinction because it goes to the theory of whether intervention in the currency markets is actually sound policy. And even more to the point, is intervention at all worthwhile if it occurs without the perception that it corresponds to an underlying change in the broader monetary policy of a region.

There have been many studies that have tried to quantify the effectiveness of intervention, particularly by a singular bank within a particular region. And broadly speaking, the consensus has been that there has mostly been very little quantifiable benefit. However, it is still true that many central banks, regardless of this opinion, still operate a reasonably aggressive intervention policy. The question as to why, goes to the point of what might be called the second type of intervention, which has to do with maintaining the currency value or peg, within an acceptable band over time. Notice in this definition, I refer to the “band over time” .

The reason for emphasizing this phrase is that unlike a concerted intervention that tries to achieve immediate results that correspond to a change in policy, singular bank intervention generally tries to reinforce or maintain the existing status

quo. This type of policy has been pursued over the years by a number of regional banks including the Bank of Japan, and Bank of China, who have been fairly successful in achieving their particular goals. But of even greater interest are the circumstances where maintaining the peg through intervention did not work. These situations eventually led to more broadly catastrophic events than might have been anticipated. Included within this category are not only some of the notable currency meltdowns that occurred in Latin America (most recently being Argentina) but also the more widely known episode with the Bank of England in the early 1990* s. In this situation, the Bank of England tried to hold the Sterling peg against the German mark at a level that was eventually breached via the component dollar equivalent trades being sold under the implied value of the cross that was being bid for by the central bank. On the day this level was breached it was widely rumored that currency hedge fund speculators, in particular those led by George Soros, were responsible. Still, the question remains as to whether the market moved because of Speculative hedge funds or, whether the true cause was the unsustainable nature of policy and intervention initiatives undertaken by the central bank in general. In this case, as with others, I would argue that the two are inextricable. Which of course goes to the issue of how and by what means are the trading positions of hedge funds of concern or even interest to the average speculator.