《外汇交易实战图表与交易心理》 作 者：(新加坡)许强 (美国)Gary Weiss

很久很久以前，有一个老饕员外，每天除了山珍海味， 另外还要吃一个红烧蹄膀和一锅全鸡炖汤，并且吃得精光。 许多朋友都惊讶于这个员外胃口真好。但替他烧菜的大厨 却不以为然：“那有什么难啊！换了我，我也能，吃好东 西谁不会啊？ ”员外知道了，就笑道：“成，打明个起，我 吃什么你吃相同的。”

于是，大厨师非常高兴地和员外一同进餐。一开始， 他毫不费劲地吃光了所有桌上的大餐；可是三天下来，他 渐渐吃不动了； 一星期后，他看见蹄膀就想咕，尤其是看 见油油花花的鸡汤就更恶心。每天的吃饭时间已成了受刑 时间，成为苦差事。而员外仍神闲气定安逸地吃完每顿饭。 撑到第七天，他实在受不了，求员外放过他，他实在吃不 下了。员外愉快地喝完最后一口鸡汤，徐缓地说：“不要 随便羡慕或嫉妒别人，看到别人有样就想学样。别人能做的你未必能，做好你的厨师本职工作就够了。”

是的，太多的市场人士，他本来是一个很好的顾问或营 销人才，但总想过大操手的瘾，不专心销售，反将薪水储 蓄或客人委托的钱输光，然后陷人困境。这种案例在过去 十多年投资生涯中，见得太多太多，许多优秀的年轻人就 毁于这一 “念”间而不自觉。

在功力未臻圆满前，操作高手不是一蹴而就的，必须 经过多重的试练。各位投资人，请记准一句老话：“有什 么样的肠胃，才去吃什么样的补药，不然开往地狱的列车 就等着你!”

成为“首富”的秘诀

台湾首富霖园集团创办人蔡万霖先生在生前，有许多 人问他成为首富的秘诀，他说只有一句话，就是“有恒心， 有耐心，一直做下去”。太经典了，其实这就是做外汇成功 的秘诀。

初学初做外汇的前阶段，总觉得不顺利，怎么做怎么 输，只要进场就输，或总是输多贏少。但交了一阵子学费 后，渐渐就能找到市场节奏，及找出适合自己的操作方法。

然而，不幸的是，大多数投资人在试了几次以后便失 去耐心，停止操作，或三天打鱼，两天晒网，断断续续， 该掌握的贏钱波段没人场，反而是不该入场的波段，输钱 的时候全人场了。长久下来，怎能不输。

用系统程序辅助交易的投资人也是一样，输了几次以 后不敢跟着自己的系统做了，一旦开始放弃，顺着自己程 序讯号的波段便来临了。只能眼巴巴地望着等待多时的机 会溜掉了。

我的结论是，你必须“有恒心，有耐心，一直做下去 (参与市场）”。你才能在每一时刻掌握可能的致富机会。记 住，惟有对某一信念有偏执的狂热与狂爱你才有可能成功。

 

附录

市场的真相

(英文原版及名词解释）

The players and how they interact

There has been great deal written about the focus of several large players within the foreign exchange markets and whether their singular activities are, themselves, capable of predicting or for that matter even exacting change on rate structures both now and in the future. In many ways this is a topic that is not particularly straightforward because there has historically been a focus towards the actions and results of a singular group, as opposed to the inter relationships between them. As a general comment, I believe this analysis tends to be lacking，mostly because the market structure of its component participants are invariably interlinked. Further, the basis for action of one group within the market often causes a reaction eunount the other groups. To put this in perspective, it is necessary to first define broad groups of maricet participants into large bands. For this purpose I will categorize certain groups that may, themselves have a degree of crossover, but can also be maintained within a generalized definitional context. These are:

1.Central Banks

2.Large hedge funds

3.Fundamental “real money” position takers, including corporate hedge vehicles.

4.Chart based speculative traders.

In the case of central banks, there has always been a certain enigma surrounding their particular functions and generalized role within the foreign exchange markets. Moreover, de pending on the region or particular monetary policy within a zone of influence, their activity can be more or less proactive with regard to intervention. Specifically, it's worth trying to classify various types of intervention that might be undertaken because there are tremendous differences as to the goals and issues associated with each. First, and probably the most widely followed is what might be called " concerted intervention" • This is an activity that is really quite infrequent and has mostly to do with a group of central banks acting to influence valuation mismatches that are broad, and across multiple geo political lines. One of the more notable examples of concerted inter vention occurred during the mid 1980^s corresponding to the Plaza accord, wherein the accord itself stated an agreed upon broad mandate to bring down the dollar valuations against a wide group of currency. In this instance, the shared mandate was in the interest of most parties to act upon. As a result, the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and The Bundesbank all acted with a singular purpose and coordinated their intervention entry and exit points so as to effectively move the currency market at various times; selling dollars against a wide basket of currency, and obviously changing the reserve mix of each of the bank participants. However,while having clearly achieved the stated objective, later historians have actually questioned whether the policy was actually achieved by virtue of intervention, or, as is now a more widely held view, was the intervention successful only because it was backed up by the market assumption that fundamental policy change was going to occur in the first place. This is an important distinction because it goes to the theory of whether intervention in the currency markets is actually sound policy. And even more to the point, is intervention at all worthwhile if it occurs without the perception that it corresponds to an underlying change in the broader monetary policy of a region.